DRAFT
1 Do organized interest groups seeking narrow benefits for their members drive American foreign policy? Or is policy more influenced by the views of epistemic communities that use their expertise to identify the national interest? Alternatively, do the collective preferences of ordinary citizens shape U.S.
foreign policy? Do the wielders of influence vary by issue domain, the level of issue salience, or the particular government institutions involved in policy making?
Such questions touch upon the classical "who governs?" query that has animated much research in American and comparative politics (Dahl, 1961) . But they are even more central to debates in international relations. They relate to the democratic character of American conduct internationally, the extent to which calculations of national interest do or do not drive U.S. foreign policy, and the general nature of domestic sources of foreign policy. To answer fundamental empirical questions about who influences government officials may help pave the way for developing broader theory regarding the determinants of international behavior.
These questions also have some bearing on important normative issues. Democratic theories emphasizing popular sovereignty and electoral accountability argue that government policy ought to reflect the views of ordinary citizens (e.g. Dahl, 1989) . Adherents of these relatively "populistic" democratic theories would presumably applaud findings of strong public influence on U.S. foreign policy.
On the other hand, more elite-oriented theories of democracy (Schumpeter, 1976; Sartori, 1987; Burke, 1949) , as well as realist theories of international relations (Morgenthau, 1973; Lippmann, 1955; Kennan, 1951) would sound an alarm. They question the competence of citizens and assert that the quality of foreign policy is likely to suffer if the mass public is allowed to have much direct impact. Evidence that experts and members of "epistemic communities" significantly affect U.S. foreign policy would be applauded by some as holding out the best hope for objectively identifying and advancing the national interest in an increasingly complex global environment (Haas, 1992; Adler and Haas, 1992; Hall, 1989) .
Alternatively, findings that organized interest groups drive U.S. foreign policy would raise troubling questions about a possible "bias in representation" toward particularistic groups (Moravcsik, 1997, 530). 4 them access to the political system and…. influence over policy debates" through agenda setting and the formulation of policy alternatives in the executive and legislative branches (2-3, 17; Adler and Haas, 1992) .
Research on epistemic communities has two implications that are important for us. First, it suggests that experts equip government officials to conduct analyses and reach decisions that can be independent of direct pressures from organized groups or citizens. The implication, then, is that business and labor may exert relatively little direct influence upon the foreign policy decisions of government officials.
Second, epistemic communities may serve as concrete mechanisms for identifying and addressing the objective interests of states that may ultimately be defined, as classical and structural realists emphasize, by inter-state competition and the structure of the international system (Waltz, 1959 (Waltz, , 1979 Walt, 1987; but cf. Rose, 1998) . Students of epistemic communities argue that realists incorrectly "assume that a state's interests are clear and that the ways in which its interests may be most efficaciously pursued are equally clear" (Haas, 1992, 13-14; Adler and Haas, 1992, 367-9) . Instead, they maintain, technical experts are the vehicle for the interpretation of international structures, the identification of the "imperatives" facing the state, and the articulation of state interests in international politics. In short, research on epistemic communities suggests that conditions of uncertainty produce strong incentives for government officials charged with making foreign policy to respond to experts from think tanks, the academy and other reservoirs of highly trained specialists and professionals.
Median Voter Theory and the Influence of Public Opinion:
Median voter theory predicts that actual or anticipated electoral competition motivates holders of government office to minimize the distance between their policy stands and the policy preferences of voters, thus responding strongly to the public's preferences. (In the case of unidimensional, two-party competition, parties are predicted to converge exactly at the position of the median voter [Downs, 1957] .) Empirical evidence of public influence upon foreign policy has been reported in a large and growing body of research by students of international relations and foreign policy (e.g. Russett, 1990; Nincic, 1990; Hartley and Russett, 1992; Wittkopf, 1990;  5 Holsti, 1996; Sobel, 2001 and . Effects of the public have also been found in quantitative analyses by students of public opinion, who have reported, for example, that 62 percent of U.S. foreign policies changed in the same direction as public opinion had previously changed (Page and Shapiro, 1983, 182) , and that congressional-district-level public support for military spending was related to Congress members' votes on military spending bills during the presidency of Ronald Reagan (Bartels, 1991 ; see also Monroe, 1979 Monroe, , 1998 . This and other evidence of influence by the public is now recognized in broader debates about international relations (e.g. Putnam, 1988, 432, 436) and national security policy, which Miroslav Nincic (1990) found to be "tethered to domestic electoral calculations," especially when elections approach (395).
The idea of government responsiveness to public opinion has also informed research on the "democratic peace," which has found a tendency for individual democratic states and especially pairs of democratic states to be more pacific on average than non-democratic states (Russett and Oneal, 2001 ; cf Elman, 1997, pp.10-20) . One line of thinking in democratic peace research argues that competitive elections "makes democratic leaders… sensitive to public opinion" because politicians either anticipate electoral punishment or are thrown out of office for being unresponsive: "citizens in a democratic state can influence governmental policy directly, through public opinion, or indirectly, though their representatives." 1 Salience may be an important condition affecting the extent of public influence. E.E. Schattschneider's (1960) analysis of the "scope of conflict" indicates that the general public should have its greatest impact on highly salient issues that draw intense attention from the media and voters and thereby pose the most direct threat of electoral punishment for government officials who are unresponsive. In contrast, narrow, well-organized interests may dominate on less visible issues. Some empirical evidence seems to support the prediction of greater public influence when salience is high (e.g. Page and Shapiro, 1983, 181) .
There are also indications that the characteristics of different government institutions may produce different degrees of influence by the public. For example, members of the House of 6 Representatives, which the Federalist Papers labeled the "people's House" due to their frequent election in small and decentralized districts, were expected to be especially sensitive to public opinion, while officials in the executive branch and Senate were expected to be less responsive due to their insulation from the public by longer terms in office and originally indirect elections.
An ample body of qualitative and quantitative research, then, indicates that U.S. foreign policy and the policy preferences of government officials are substantially influenced by public opinion.
Apparently accepting such influence as an empirical fact, a long line of observers including classical realists has urged policy makers not to respond to the preferences of citizens, because of concerns that the general public engages in "simple moralistic and legalistic" thinking, is detached from the reality of international politics, exhibits unstable shifting "moods," and hungers for "quick results" (Morgenthau, 1973, pp. 135, 146-148; cf. Almond, 1950; Kennan, 1951) . Walter Lippmann (1955) warned that following public opinion would create a "morbid derangement of the true functions of power" and produce policies "deadly to the very survival of the state as a free society" (15, 20, (26) (27) .
Problems with Past Research:
Previous research concerning the impact of organized groups, epistemic communities, and public opinion on U.S. foreign policy has produced an impressive body of results that point in diverse directions regarding who influences government officials. It has not, however, definitely sorted out the relative impact of different factors upon U.S. foreign policy. Even excellent case studies that disentangle causal mechanisms and trace processes of policy making usually leave open the issue of how well they generalize beyond those particular cases. Perhaps even more importantly, lack of definitiveness has also resulted from two problems related to the scholarly division of labor: omitted variables and lack of comparative testing. Understandably, each of the three main approaches we have reviewed has tended to focus on a set of variables of particular interest to it, rarely investigating and testing competing explanations at the same time. Most studies of public opinion and foreign policy, for example, (including those by the present authors) have failed to include any independent variables other than public opinion. However understandable this research strategy may be, it runs the risk that other 7 important influences may be neglected. It may lead each approach to overestimate the importance of its own favorite factors and to offer little or no estimate of the relative impact of different possible influences.
What is now needed, we believe, is comparative analysis, based on a large number of diverse cases, of the relative influence upon U.S. foreign policy of several key actors, including organized interest groups (especially business and labor); epistemic communities from think tanks and the academy; and mass public opinion. The present paper attempts to take a first step in that direction.
Data and Methods
We have analyzed a set of data that are uniquely well suited to this purpose, drawn from eight quadrennial pairs of surveys that that were sponsored from 1974 through 2002 by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) and implemented by the Gallup and Harris organizations.
2 These surveys, covering a large and diverse set of foreign policy issues, elicited the policy preferences of the general public and also the preferences of several distinct sets of "foreign policy leaders," including policy makers (government officials in the executive branch, the House of Representatives, and the Senate), members of critical interest groups (especially business and labor), and members of epistemic communities (educators and leaders of private foreign policy organizations or think tanks). 3 These parallel surveys of the mass public and foreign policy leaders have both strengths and limitations. The government officials and other elites were not randomly selected for interviews; they were chosen from institutional positions involving foreign policy responsibilities or expertise. 4 Although a total of 2,916 elites were interviewed in the eight leadership surveys, the number of each specific type of elite interviewed in any single year was not very large. 5 (The surveys of the general public were based on random, relatively large samples of about 1,550 respondents each. We employed four different types of regression models involving distinct analytic approaches.
First, in Model 1 we conducted purely cross-sectional analyses, regressing the preferences of policy makers at a given time on those of business people, experts, labor leaders, and ordinary citizens at that same time. These cross-sectional analyses generally used all eight pairs of surveys together, which included a total of 567 in-common items ascertaining preferences about foreign policy: that is, 567
questions about policy preferences that were asked in a given year, with identical wording, of both citizens and elites. 11 The number of items varied from a high of 112 in 2002 to a low of 48 in 1986. For each of the 567 issue cases we constructed percentage measures of the aggregate policy preferences of policy makers, the general public, business people, labor leaders, and foreign policy experts (as well as other groups), and analyzed predictors of the variation in policy makers' preferences across issue cases.
Model 1 style cross-sectional analyses have some usefulness. They may be particularly helpful for capturing quick or near-instantaneous effects: if, for example, prominent experts or business leaders were to gain rapid access to policy makers and influence them at once, with the effects fading as new circumstances arise. But they are less apt to identify slow-acting or delayed effects by other actors.
Moreover, cross-sectional analyses -absent simultaneous equation techniques 12 -are notoriously subject to causal ambiguity. And they cannot deal with the possibility that past government decisions may structure or "lock in" the positions of current officials, as in the incrementalism of government budget making (Wildavsky, 1975) . We need a regression model that incorporates any "inertial" forces in foreign affairs and, to the extent possible, controls for them.
Our second type of regression model (Model 2) keeps the basic cross-sectional design for independent variables but addresses the potential for incremental, self-reinforcing dynamics by lagging the dependent variable and studying the effects of foreign policy decision makers' previous preferences.
For this purpose we need data on the past history of our dependent variables. Fortunately, the CCFR surveys allow us to identify many "two-time-period" cases -that is, pairs of identical survey items that were asked of both the mass public and elites in two sequential surveys. We identified 252 sequential pairs, which permit us to conduct regression analyses that lag the dependent variable for one periodusing responses to the same policy preference question when it was asked in the survey four years earlier.
In such regressions, policy makers' 2002 support for economic foreign aid (for example) is predicted by the policy makers' 1998 views on aid, together with the 2002 preferences of the mass public, business and labor leaders, and experts.
Model 2 analyses allow us to examine the impact on policy makers of contemporaneous preferences of the general public, business and labor leaders, and experts, while taking account of the effects of the past policy preferences of government officials. But there is danger that using the lagged dependent variable may introduce excessive controls for prior influences, particularly quick-acting influences that may already have been incorporated in the prior value of the dependent variable and are then "controlled" away. In addition, Model 2 (like Model 1) remains prey to causal ambiguity.
Statistically disentangling whether public opinion and non-governmental elites affect policy makers, or whether the reverse happens -whether policy makers influence the preferences of others -is a daunting challenge. One promising approach is to track temporal sequences (i.e., to see whether changes in hypothesized independent variables actually precede changes in the dependent variable) and to employ the logic of "Granger causality" (i.e., to see whether the history of hypothesized independent variables actually adds explanatory power to that of the history of dependent variables; see Freeman, 1983) .
Our third type of regression model (Model 3) uses the data from sequential pairs of survey questions to conduct two-observation time series analyses, with lagged values for independent as well as dependent variables. Although the restriction to two time points prevents us from using the full power of time series techniques, we can at least begin to get at the logic of causal time asymmetries and Granger causality. For example, in such a regression the 2002 preferences of policy makers concerning foreign economic aid are predicted by the 1998 preferences concerning aid of the public, experts, labor and business leaders, and the policy makers themselves. Since causes generally precede rather than follow effects, this time asymmetry adds to our confidence about causal inference. Incorporating the most recent past history of the independent and dependent variables begins to get at Granger causal logic.
The Model 3, two-observation time series analyses take good advantage of the CCFR data but are not without limitations. First, because of the four-year intervals between surveys, the time lags are relatively long. They may not allow us to distinguish the different speeds and durability with which different groups may exercise influence. For instance, major, internationally oriented business leaders or prominent experts might be able to exercise influence especially quickly because they are highly attuned to policy impacts and have privileged access to policy makers. By contrast, labor leaders might tend to have only delayed -but possibly long-lasting -influence due to reliance on building up pressure in congressional districts. Second, we lack a full account of the history of the independent and dependent variables and therefore cannot explore different lags or conduct full Granger tests. We can only lag our variables one period. Finally, the need for identical questions in two sequential surveys reduces the number of cases available for analysis, which reduces the precision of estimates and makes it more difficult for results to attain statistical significance.
The fourth type of regression model (Model 4) pursues the logic of Model 3 one step further: it uses change measures for dependent variables and change measures for the independent variables. In particular, Model 4 examines whether changes in the views of business, experts, labor, and members of the mass public predict changes in the preferences of policy makers. For example, the changes between 1998 and 2002 in policy makers' preferences regarding economic aid are predicted by the 1998 to 2002 13 changes in the aid preferences of the public, experts, labor and business leaders. The strength of this model is that it is explicitly dynamic. Model 4 controls automatically for all possible influences on the immediately prior values of dependent and independent variables. It also promises to give leverage on causal ordering; evidence that changes in the independent and dependent variables covary strengthens the basis for inferring causation. On the other hand, the necessary focus on changes in both dependent and independent variables over the same time period may reintroduce problems with reciprocal causation: we cannot generally tell which change actually occurred first.
Each of these four models offers a distinct approach to disentangling complex causal connections, based on the available opportunities and challenges of an unusual data set. Rather than select one or two models for exclusive attention (Models 3 and 4, say), we have pursued a strategy of methodological pluralism. We are particularly interested in exploring patterns across all four models. A convergence of estimates from four distinct models would strengthen our confidence in the results and would be very gratifying. On the other hand, differences among them might help establish boundaries within which the true magnitudes are likely to lie.
Analyzing Influences on Foreign Policy Makers
Before turning to the multiple regression models we examined simple bivariate relationships at one point in time between the aggregate preferences of all policy makers taken together and those of the mass public as well as each of the seven distinct clusters of "foreign policy leaders" that the Chicago
Council surveys repeatedly interviewed (business, labor, educators, private foreign policy organizations or think tanks, editors and journalists from the media, special interest groups relevant to foreign policy, and religious officials). All these bivariate relationships were positive, quite large, and highly significant at the p<.01 level. The percentage of policy makers preferring a specific policy was most strongly correlated with the percentage preferring the same policy among respondents from the media (r=.94), business (r=.91), foreign policy organizations and think tanks (r=.90), and educators (r=.90). Religious leaders (r=.85) and labor leaders (r=.84) came not far behind, with the general public (r=.77) taking up the 14 rear. The current preferences of policy makers were almost as strongly correlated (and highly significantly so) with the preferences of these same groups measured in the previous time period.
The results for business are consistent with previous research on the role of organized interest groups in U.S. foreign policy, and the findings for think tanks and educators are in line with the analysis of epistemic communities. The relatively low figures for the public are somewhat surprising, however,
given previous findings that policy makers are highly responsive to public opinion.
There are reasons to doubt that the high bivariate correlations for religious leaders and the media really reflect major, direct impacts upon the making of U.S. foreign policy. Few scholars have asserted that such impacts occur, and in theoretical terms, any such influence would presumably be channeled mostly through the public. It seems possible that the high correlations were spurious or resulted from reciprocal relationships. The media, for example, have not often been identified as a direct influence on policy making, but considerable research does suggest the opposite causal connection -i.e. influence by government officials upon media that rely heavily on officials as news sources (e.g. Sigal, 1973; Hallin, 1986; Bennett, 1990 and 1994; Nacos et al, 2000, Part I; Entman, 2004) .
Not only did the preferences of all the elite groups surveyed by the Chicago Council correlate highly with the preferences of policymakers; they also correlated very highly with each other. The same "garbage can" approach using our other regression models generally seemed to confirm strong effects by business. Model 2, cross-sectional analysis except for a lagged dependent variable (policy makers' preferences from the previous survey), showed large and highly significant coefficients for business (b=.29), with the effects of labor and think tanks only about half as strong and the coefficient for the public failing to reach statistical significance. (The estimated effect of the lagged dependent variable was statistically significant but only moderate, b=.18). Model 3, regressing the current preferences of policy makers on the four-year-previous preferences of the public, elite groups, and policy makers, seemed to confirm the influence of business (b=.27) and added new evidence of labor's effects (b=.36) -perhaps indicating a delayed impact over time. The lagged dependent variable remained significant and became substantial (b=.35), but the coefficients for the public, educators, think tanks, the media, and religious groups did not reach statistical significance.
16
These "garbage can" analyses, however, ran afoul of two serious methodological problems. First, the cohesiveness of the "foreign policy establishment" did indeed produce extremely high levels of multicollinearity, with VIF coefficients of more than 20 for the media and 15 for educators in the cross sectional analysis (a VIF coefficient above 10 is generally considered troubling: see Chatterjee and Price, 1991) . Second, the theoretical rationale for the causal structure of these analyses is highly questionable.
For example, they treated the preferences of media figures as a purely independent variable that directly influences government officials, even though previous research (as noted above) suggests the opposite causal connection. Direct impact by religious leaders also seems questionable.
We refined our subsequent analyses to include only a theoretically solid core of independent variables. We dropped from analysis the media variable (which suffered from high multicollinearity and causal ambiguity), religious leaders (also causally ambiguous), and "special interest groups" (poorly defined and showing little estimated impact). Further, we combined educators with respondents from private foreign policy organizations and think tanks, whose preferences were highly correlated with each other (r=.92, p< .01) and played essentially the same roles in regressions when entered separately. The result was a single variable for the policy preferences of "experts," which is consistent with research on epistemic communities.
Subsequent regression analyses using this refined, parsimonious set of independent variables yielded results that were considerably more satisfying, both substantively and methodologically.
In our first and most important refined analyses, we used all available issue cases from all surveys. The dependent variables were the foreign policy preferences of all policy makers combined, and (separately) the preferences of each of the three clusters of officials: those from the administration, the House of Representatives, and the Senate. These analyses included only the four independent variables needed to test the principal theoretical expectations we have discussed, namely the preferences of the general public, business, labor, and foreign policy experts.
For the cross-sectional models, each of these independent variables (with the possible exceptions of experts and the mass public) can reasonably be treated as exogenous with respect to government decision makers. The policy preferences of business and labor leaders are arguably rooted in economic interests and in well-developed values; they are not likely to vacillate with the particular officials currently holding office. "Experts," on the other hand, may be cultivated and even selected by officials.
The foreign policy preferences of the mass public may be influenced by government officials as well.
This would lend ambiguity to the interpretation of large coefficients for the public, but (as we will see) no such coefficients have been found. Estimates of a lack of influence are largely free of causal ambiguity. Tables 1 through 4 shows that our regression models were rather effective in accounting for the variation in policy makers' preferences. Adjusted R-squared values were all high, ranging from .70 to .90 for Models 1-3 and only moderately lower (as would be expected when using change scores) for Model 4. Taken together, the preferences of business, experts, labor and the public can account for the bulk of variation in the foreign policy preferences of policy makers, both contemporaneously and over time. This is particularly true for all policy makers together, but nearly as much so for the separate groups of officials.
Business Influence. The strongest and most consistent results in Table 1 are the coefficients for business, which suggest that internationally oriented business corporations are strongly influential in U.S. foreign policy. According to the Model 1 cross-sectional analysis, when the support among business people for a given foreign policy are higher by 10 percentage points, the support among policy makers (taken together) tends to be higher by about 5 points.
Business preferences were the strongest predictor of officials' preferences within each of the three separate institutional arenas, peaking at a .71 coefficient for administration officials (where it was more than double the only other significant coefficient, that for experts). To the extent that the executive branch dominates foreign policy, extensive influence by business on administration officials would be especially striking. This finding is consistent with the expectations of many international relations scholars who focus on interest groups, but not with the expectations of those who envision an autonomous executive.
(Insert Table 1 about here)
Taking account of possible inertial forces in policy making by lagging the dependent variable, Model 2 produces a similar story of relative strong business effects upon all groups of policy makers separately or together, especially administration officials ( Table 2 ). The consistently significant and moderately strong coefficients for policy makers' preferences lagged one period indicate that the contemporary views of policy makers are indeed influenced or conditioned by the history of already established perspectives. Business leaders, then, apparently exert some effect on government officials that is quite independent of whatever impact they have also had upon past policy that is carried forward through the self-reinforcing quality of previous decisions.
(Insert Table 2 about here)
The Model 3 time series analysis in Table 3 provides a stronger test of whether the views of business "cause" changes in the foreign policy preferences of policy makers, according to the logic of Granger models. Regressing the current preferences of all policy makers (as well as each separate group of officials) on the independent and dependent variables from the four-years-previous survey largely confirmed the major impact of business, with one wrinkle. These results suggest that business leaders are most influential on officials in the Senate and especially the administration, while possibly not exerting any meaningful effect at all on officials in the House of Representatives. 13 As we have noted, Model 3 may actually underestimate the impact of business, if such impact occurs quickly, since part of that effect may be "controlled" away by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable that already embodies it. Still, because of Model 3's use of time asymmetries to pin down the causal direction of influence, the somewhat smaller business coefficients in Table 3 may represent our best estimates.
(Insert Table 3 about here) 19 Model 4 offers a further perspective by using change measures (changes from one survey to the next in percentage support for a given policy) for both the dependent and independent variables. Table 4 shows that under this model, too, the basic pattern of substantial business influence holds. Business people (along with experts) are estimated to exert the strongest effects on policy makers overall and especially on administration officials. It indicates that when business people change their support for a given foreign policy by 10 percentage points, policy makers taken together tend during the same period to change their support by 3.2 points in the same direction, while administration officials alter their views by 4.6 points in a congruent direction. Such an institutional differentiation of business influence is foreseen by some previous research in international relations, which stresses the particular responsiveness to business of administration officials seeking to improve economic conditions and encourage voters to reward (rather than punish) the president as they retrospectively evaluate the incumbent's performance.
The lower R-squared statistics in Table 4 reflect the greater analytic challenge of explaining changes (Model 4) as opposed to levels (Models 1-3); the variance in both independent and dependent variables is much smaller and a higher proportion of it is random noise, especially for the aggregate preferences of relatively small groups like Senators and administration officials.
(Insert Table 4 about here)
A clear message from all four models is that business is a consistently effective influence on policy makers. Its absolute and relative influence does appear to vary, though, based on how the different models treat the passage of time. The contrast between the cross-sectional and the time-lag models suggest that business leaders may exert strong effects quite rapidly, perhaps through phone calls and other direct contacts with officials.
Experts. Experts, judging by some of our models, also appear to be a potent force affecting the views of policy makers. According to cross-sectional Models 1 and 2, experts have the second strongest contemporaneous influence (next to business) on policy makers' preferences (see Tables 1 and 2 ). This finding, which at least partly fits the expectations of researchers on epistemic communities, applies with nearly equal magnitude to all policy makers taken together and also to those from each of the three 20 institutional settings analyzed separately. But according to the time series analysis of Model 3, experts did not exert any significant influence at all. This suggests either that experts' impact is extremely quick, fully embodied in policy makers' previously-measured preferences, or (perhaps more plausibly) that the expressed preferences of experts are largely effects rather than causes of policy makers' stands. That is, the substantial estimated effects in cross-sectional Models 1 and 2 may be inflated by simultaneity bias.
The same problem may affect the results of Model 4, which indicates that changes in experts' and policy makers' preferences over the same time period tend to go in the same direction. Since these changes are measured between the same two time points (previous and current surveys), we cannot be sure which change actually preceded or caused the other. Still, we cannot dismiss the possibility that experts and epistemic communities have substantial influence on officials.
The Public. Perhaps the most surprising finding in this whole set of analyses is the apparent weakness of public opinion. Even with these reduced and refined models, the public does not appear to exert substantial, consistent influence upon the makers of foreign policy. In none of sixteen regression analyses, applying our four models to four sets of decision makers, was the public opinion coefficient dominant over those of the elite actors. The contemporaneous Model 1 estimate for the effect of public preferences on officials in the House of Representatives was statistically significant but weak (b=.10); the public had no significant effects, even by a one-tailed test or the loose p<.10 standard, in Model 2. 14 The negative coefficients for public opinion in the time series analysis (Model 3), if taken seriously, actually indicate thatcontrolling for the past views of governmental and non-governmental elites -officials tend perversely to move away from public opinion. A more plausible interpretation of these borderline-significant coefficients, however, is that the public simply has no effect at all. Taken together, these findings hint at partial confirmation of the Founders' expectations about the House of Representatives as "the people's" chamber. More importantly, however, they run against the thrust of much past research that has found substantial impacts of public opinion. The analyses in Tables 1 through 4 form the bedrock of our empirical investigation. But we also used the same four regression models to explore possible variations in influence upon policy makers during different time periods and across three different domains of foreign policy -Defense, Diplomacy, Defense policy there were some indications, consistent with previous literature (e.g. Snyder, 1991) , that business has a particularly strong effect on policy makers. Because of the limited number of cases, interpretation of the issue-specific results requires caution.
Searching for Public Influence on Government Officials. Given the surprisingly weak
estimates of influence by public opinion (with the partial exceptions of effects on House members and in economic policy), we were concerned that real public influence might be masked by the inclusion in the analysis of labor leaders, whom we found to have moderate influence on policy makers and whose preferences were fairly strongly correlated with those of the public (r=.82). In order to provide the best possible opportunity for public opinion to display effects, we dropped the labor variable and regressed the preferences of policy makers only on the preferences of the general public, business, and experts.
The proportion of variance accounted for was virtually the same as in the earlier analyses, indicating that the public and labor can indeed be substituted for each other without losing much predictive power. But even with these rather generous -and somewhat implausible -causal assumptions (namely, that labor leaders have no independent impact upon foreign policy at all but merely act as statistical proxies for the general public), the estimated influence of public opinion upon the preference of government officials remained, at best, modest.
The Model 1 cross sectional analysis excluding labor produced coefficients for public influence on all policymakers (b=.11), officials in the House (.21) and Senate officials (.12) that were statistically 23 significant and larger than in the earlier analysis. But they remained smaller than the comparable coefficients for business (.50 for all policy makers, .40 for House officials, .40 for Senate officials) or experts (.40, .41, .44, respectively; all significant at p<.01). Much the same thing (though with somewhat higher public coefficients) was true of contemporaneous-change Model 4. 15 And in Model 2 the estimated effects of public opinion mostly vanished, with only a small coefficient for public influence on the "people's House" (.12) remaining statistically significant. In Model 3, our touchstone for "real,"
over-time influence, public opinion had no significant effects at all. None of the four models indicated any clearly significant public influence upon the administration, the main center for foreign policy decision making.
Parallel labor-excluded analyses across the three different policy domains mostly continued to
show the public as a minor influence, with less impact than experts or, especially, business, except on Economic policies. Other results hinted at support for the Schattschneider (1960) view that the public has more influence on high-salience than low-salience issues, but estimates of public impact remained modest even for the very highest-salience issues, where -according to all four models -the estimated impact of both business and experts remained substantially greater than that of the public. 16 In short, in spite of generous model specifications, the effect of public opinion upon the preferences of foreign policy makers appears to be -at best -modest, when critical competing variables are controlled for. In general, public opinion takes a back seat to business and experts. These results challenge research that has suggested a generally strong public impact on foreign policy.
Still, we are not suggesting that public opinion has no effect at all on U.S. foreign policy. We have noted indications of significant public impact upon members of the House of Representatives, on economic policy, and (perhaps) on issues of especially high salience. The public may play a substantial part in highly salient questions of war and peace, such as those analyzed by Sobel (2001) . Further, we have not explored possible effects by the public upon agenda setting, or on the rhetorical packaging of policy choices, or on decision makers' anticipation of later, retrospective public opinion. (The makers of foreign policy may, for example, work hard to avoid high levels of military casualties that could provoke 24 electoral punishment; see Mueller, 1973.) But it is worth emphasizing that our measurements of public opinion, based on large sample surveys, are quite good; any attenuation of coefficients due to measurement error should affect elite groups more than the public. And this sort of result is not likely to result from model mis-specification due to causal ambiguities. An erroneous finding of non-influence by the public is considerably less likely to result from simultaneity bias than is an excessively large estimate of its influence. 17 All in all, the implications of our findings for previous research connecting public opinion and policy making are sobering.
Indirect Business and Labor Influence through Experts?
The substantial influence of experts suggested by our cross-sectional models and the simultaneous-change Model 4, though in line with past research on epistemic communities, is subject to doubt about its causal status. Even if one sets aside the possibility of reciprocal influences by officials upon experts that would tend to inflate their apparent impact on officials (a possibility highlighted by the null findings from Model 3 over-time analyses), there remains the question of whether the preferences of experts are a truly independent variable or whether they function in an intervening role. For example, experts might themselves be influenced by business or labor, and in turn transmit the preferences of those groups to officials.
Researchers on epistemic communities sometimes assume that policy makers are guided by independent, objective analysis from new "knowledge-based elites"; that experts are not merely vehicles for pressing officials on behalf of organized interests. Yet the widespread funding of think tanks by business -and, to a much lesser extent, by organized labor -suggests that interest groups may sometimes affect who becomes a recognized expert and what such experts say. Thus experts might not be autonomous influences upon policy makers, but instead might -in whole or in part -convey others' preferences to officials.
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Without additional data we cannot hope to definitively untangle these causal complexities. But we already know, from our discussion of a possible "foreign policy establishment," that the policy preferences of experts are not statistically independent of the preferences of business or labor. They are quite highly correlated. The foreign policy preferences of think tank respondents, for example, were correlated at r=.90 with the contemporaneous preferences of business and r=.80 with those of labor.
If we assume one-way causation from business and labor to experts, 18 we can go further and estimate the independent effects of each, through regressions in which experts' preferences are the dependent variable. The results, shown in Table 5 , are quite striking. The cross-sectional Model 1 analysis indicates that business had a highly significant and quite large coefficient (b=.61, p<.001), and labor was not far behind (b=.42, p<.001). Taking into account the self-reinforcing quality of experts' previous views (with Model 2), business' estimated effect on experts was nearly twice the magnitude of labor's (b=.48 versus .27). Much the same was true in Model 4's simultaneous-change analysis. In the time series analysis of Model 3, however, the four-year-lagged views of business showed no significant effect, which suggests that business's influence on experts (if any) is felt relatively quickly.
(Insert Table 5 about here)
The results in Table 5 suggest that organized groups do influence experts, and that this impact is quite substantial. If we set aside the time series findings of no expert effects on policy makers, and accept the cross-sectional estimates of substantial contemporaneous effects, we can go on to estimate indirect effects that business and labor may have upon public officials through their influence on experts. For example, if (as the Model 1 cross-sectional analysis in Table 5 indicates) a 1 percentage point increase in business support for some policy generally leads to a .61 percentage point increase in experts' support for that policy, and if (as Table 1 20 This amounts to a surprisingly strong impact, given labor's reputation for general ineffectiveness in American politics. It is an impact that appears to occur with some delay over time (recall Table 3 ) and to depend significantly on indirect influence through experts. Even so, the estimated total effect upon foreign policy of business is more than twice that of labor.
Methodological uncertainties mean that we should not take the magnitudes of these estimates as gospel. Still, they pose a challenge for those who consider the views of experts to be altogether autonomous.
Foreign Policy, the National Interest, and Democracy
Our analyses using four distinct types of statistical models indicate that internationally-oriented business leaders exercise strong, consistent, and perhaps lopsided influence upon the makers of U.S.
foreign policy. The estimates of strong business influence hold up under different models, for different political and institutional conditions, and for different time periods. They hold for high-as well as lowsalience issues, for a variety of substantive issue areas, and with respect to different institutional groups of policy makers (though especially for executive branch and Senate officials). These findings tend to confirm theoretical expectations and empirical research from the organized interest group literature in international relations.
The estimated impacts of experts upon policy makers do not generally match those of business, but they, too, are quite substantial, according to three of our four models (though not the Model 3
analyses of impact over time). This lends some credence to claims by analysts of epistemic communities.
Our further investigation of who influences experts, however, suggests that organized groups -not just independent, objective evaluations of complex international realities -may color the views of experts.
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These findings suggest that the direct foreign policy clout of business and labor may be augmented by an indirect influence upon policy makers that works through experts.
Labor, even taking into account its possible indirect influence through experts, has less impact on the makers of U.S. foreign policy than business does. This finding, too, fits with some previous work by international relations scholars who focus on organized interest groups. Nonetheless, labor leaders do appear to exert a surprisingly consistent (if secondary) influence on policy makers, especially on members of the House of Representatives and concerning particular types of issues.
The findings from our cross-sectional and simultaneous-change analyses, as contrasted with the time series analyses using lagged independent variables, suggest that the influence of business tends to be fairly quick, while labor's influence tends to be delayed and is exerted over time as labor makes its presence in congressional districts felt. Although labor's effect on foreign policy has been downplayed by some international relations scholars, our evidence of labor's impact is consistent with recent reevaluations of its nested impact on U.S. social welfare policy (Gottschaulk, 2001 ).
To our surprise, public opinion -the aggregate foreign policy preferences of ordinary citizenswas repeatedly estimated by our Models 1-3 to have little or no significant effect on government officials.
When effects of public opinion emerged in these models (namely on economic issues, on members of the House of Representatives, and perhaps on very high-salience issues) the absolute and relative magnitudes of effects were generally modest. These findings of little influence by public opinion are generally immune to issues of model specification and causal ambiguity that may affect some of our other results.
On the other hand, the moderately strong estimates of public influence using Model 4 (based on sameperiod changes) may be inflated by simultaneity bias, and should probably be taken as establishing an upper bound on public effects. Even those estimates were generally smaller than for business or experts.
These results contradict expectations drawn from a large body of previous research.
If one accepts the survey-measured aggregate policy preferences of foreign policy decision makers as satisfactory indicators of actual policy (and we have argued that it is reasonable to do so), our 28 findings have several important implications for understanding U.S. foreign policy, international affairs, and American democratic governance.
First, these findings underline the continuing importance of moving from mono-causal explanations to multi-causal explanations in international relations scholarship (see Keohane, 1989, and Putnam, 1988) . Although recent work in international relations (e.g. Snyder, 1991; Moravcsik, 1998; Russett and Oneal, 2001 ) has shown substantial progress in this respect, there is still a pressing need for comprehensive examinations of multiple possible determinants of U.S. foreign policy across a range of issues.
Our evidence suggests that business may exert the most consistent influence on government officials, but that policy makers' views may also be affected by labor, experts and, to a lesser extent, public opinion. These results suggest that three of the most prominent lines of analysis of foreign policy -the interest group, epistemic community, and public opinion approaches -each have some merit. But at the same time, research along each of these lines has tended to omit critical alternative variables. It has seldom systematically examined the relative impact of competing influences. This risks artificially inflating estimates of the importance of particular factors of interest.
This hazard seems particularly serious for quantitative analyses of the effect of public opinion, not only on foreign policy (see, however, Ostrom and Marra [1986] and Hartley and Russett [1992] , which take steps to be multivariate) but also on U.S. domestic policy. For instance, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson's widely discussed Macro Polity (2002) concludes that domestic policy is highly responsive to public opinion, yet it comes to that conclusion without considering the possible impact of organized interests. In our analyses, a very strong bivariate relationship between public opinion and the preferences of policy makers crumbled away almost completely when we included data on organized interests and experts in multivariate regressions. To be sure, foreign policy may be quite different from domestic (Wildavsky, 1991; Art, 1973 ), but we cannot be certain of this until comparable research is conducted that includes the relevant variables.
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Second, our results have some troubling normative implications. The apparently weak influence of the public will presumably disappoint those adherents of democratic theory (e.g. Dahl, 1989 ) who advocate substantial government responsiveness to citizens' preferences. Our findings indicate that the gravitational pull upon foreign policy decision makers by the "foreign policy establishment" (especially business leaders and experts) tends to be stronger than the attraction of public opinion. This is consistent with the pattern of extensive and persistent "gaps" that Chicago Council studies have found between the foreign policy preferences of the public and those of policy makers. For example, ordinary Americans, more than policy makers or other elites, have repeatedly expressed stronger support for protecting Americans' jobs, stopping the inflow of illegal drugs, and reducing illegal immigration, as well as for a multilateral, cooperative foreign policy based on bolstering the United Nations, working closely with allies, and participating in international treaties and agreements (Boutin and Page, 2002) .
Comparatively muted influence by the mass public might initially please classical realist critics of citizen input into foreign affairs, who consider public opinion to be ill-informed and capricious (e.g. Lippmann, 1955 ). Yet those same critics would want to see policy makers rise above the politics of organized interest groups in order to pursue the "national interest," perhaps as identified by independent, objective experts. Our finding of substantial impact upon foreign policy by business -generally greater impact than by experts -suggests that purely technocratic calculations do not always predominate in the making of foreign policy. Competing political interests continue to fight over the national interest, and business often wins that competition. Russett and Oneal, 2001, 274; Peterson, 1995, 10-11; also cf. Russett, 1996, 100 . Alternatively, the democratic peace has been attributed to liberal norms that promote non-violent resolution of conflict, international law and shared membership in intergovernmental organizations, and economic interdependence that puts a premium on stable, ongoing commercial relations (Doyle, 1983; Russett and Oneal, 2001; Owen, 1994; Elman, 1997) .
2 The 2002 study was co-sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Gallup conducted the surveys in
